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The idea that the particular language one speaks importantly affects the manner in which one perceives 
and thinks about the world—the linguistic relativity hypothesis—has a long but somewhat checkered 
history within the disciplines of psychology, anthropology, linguistics, and philosophy. Benjamin Lee 
Whorf, this century's most influential proponent of the linguistic relativity hypothesis, expressed its 
central proposition as follows:  
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate 
from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the 
contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our 
minds—and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.… We are thus introduced to a new 
principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the 
same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be 
calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213–214) 
Whorf's writings were the primary inspiration for a small flurry of behavioral research on the language-
cognition relation that arose in the 1950s and continued into the 1960s, most of which was concerned 
with the impact of language on color memory and object classification. By the 1970s, the linguistic 
relativity hypothesis had largely fallen into disfavor. This was due in part to the vague and sometimes 
extreme form in which Whorf had stated the hypothesis. It also occurred because anthropology had begun 
to accord more importance to linguistic and cultural universals than to linguistic and cultural differences 
(e.g., Berlin & Kay, 1969), and psychology had begun to question (both on empirical and on conceptual 
grounds) the assumption that categorization is arbitrary and was moving toward the view that the 
perceptual world contains its own builtin category structure (e.g., Rosch, 1974). Recently, however, there 
have been signs of renewed interest in the linguistic relativity hypothesis. More sophisticated theoretical 
analyses of the language-cognition relation (e.g., Bloom, 1981), as well as methodologically superior 
empirical work (e.g., Lucy & Shweder, 1979), are helping to clarify the ways in which linguistic 
classifications and linguistic structures can and do partially shape the cognitive categories and processes 
by which we come to know the world. 
This revival of interest in the linguistic relativity hypothesis is particularly timely in view of the central 
conceptual role currently accorded to the schema concept in cognitive, social, and developmental 
psychology. As Bloom (1981) has argued, language affects cognitive life in two general ways. First, it 
influences the development of our repertory of cognitive schemas:  
In addition … to developing a large number of schemas free of the influence of language, which never 
come to be labeled, and to developing a large number of schemas free of the influence of language, which 
come in time to be labeled, but whose internal organization remain unaffected by the fact that they receive 
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labels, the child will construct or reconstruct a very large number of schemas expressly to meet the 
requirements of linguistic labels. (Bloom, 1981, p. 66) 
An example of this last type of schema is that labeled by the word dog; dogs do not constitute an 
especially coherent or distinctive category, and were it not for the necessity of learning the correct use of 
the word dog, it is unlikely that the child would ever arrive at this particular equivalence class. Other, 
more abstract examples include the schemas labeled by the words sister, amount, and tao. 
Second, those schemas that have linguistic labels enjoy a special status in our mental life. According to 
Bloom, this is because the use of verbal symbols not only is a prerequisite to overt social communication 
but also facilitates the covert self-communication in which we engage to structure our own thought 
processes.  
We seem to call specially upon those of our schemas that have names, via their names, when we want to 
disengage particular schematic perspectives from the collectivity of our interacting associations, ideas, 
and experiences and make use of those discrete, structured perspectives on reality as stable points of 
mental orientation to provide direction to our continuing cognitive activities. (Bloom, 1981, p. 76) 
There is now a good deal of evidence attesting to the special role played by labeled schemas in such 
diverse cognitive activities as object classification (Carroll & Casagrande, 1958; Greenfield, Reich, & 
Olver, 1966), memory for forms (Carmichael, Hogan, & Walter, 1932), creative problem solving 
(Higgins & Chaires, 1980), and deductive reasoning (Clark, 1969), among others (see Bloom, 1981, for a 
review). Perhaps the best-known research on the power of linguistic labels to guide mental activity is the 
series of studies on color memory initiated by Brown and Lenneberg (1954). Collectively, this research 
has demonstrated that those colors that are most readily and most accurately codable (i.e., those that have 
accessible, accurate verbal labels) are also the colors that people are best able to remember when tested 
for their recognition memory (e.g., Brown & Lenneberg, 1954; Lantz & Stefflre, 1964; Lucy & Shweder, 
1979; Stefflre, Castillo Vales, & Morley, 1966). 
Furthermore, given that language affects the acquisition and use of our cognitive schemas, it follows that 
different languages, because they label certain perspectives on the world but not others, must affect their 
speakers' repertories of schemas in language-specific ways. This, of course, is simply the linguistic 
relativity hypothesis restated in contemporary terms. 
Surprisingly, the linguistic relativity hypothesis has never, to our knowledge, been tested in the domain of 
social cognition. Indeed, it is ironic that researchers in the linguistic relativity tradition have typically 
sought to demonstrate effects of language on thought in domains (such as color memory) where language 
would seem intuitively to play only a minor role. If linguistic effects on cognitive activity can be 
demonstrated even here, however, then the effects of language on the more subjective, less perceptually 
grounded kinds of thinking involved in our transactions with the social world must almost certainly be 
still more pronounced. This study was therefore designed to test whether distinct languages (in this case, 
English and Chinese) are capable of exerting language-specific effects on people's impressions of and 
memory for other individuals. 
One important way in which the social lexicons of languages vary is their codification of individual 
differences, that is, their repertories of labeled schemas for personality traits and types. No language has 
names for all possible behavior patterns, and the particular personality traits and types singled out for 
labeling differ somewhat from language to language. For example, what is the English term for the type 
of personality characterized by these attributes: worldly, experienced, socially skillful, devoted to his or 
her family, and somewhat reserved? Most readers will agree that there is no economical expression in 
English that names this particular constellation of attributes. On the other hand, it is just this constellation 
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of attributes that is named by the Chinese term shì gù. Thus, Chinese possesses a relatively short, precise 
label summarizing a cluster of personality qualities that English can express only via a long string of 
adjectives. Does this linguistic difference imply that Chinese speakers have readier access to a cognitive 
schema corresponding to that personality type and would, when confronted with an individual displaying 
that configuration of attributes, be more likely to demonstrate the sorts of cognitive responses associated 
with schematic processing? 
To address this question, we first identified two personality schemas that, like the one named by shì gù, 
have economical labels in Chinese but not in English, and two that have economical labels in English but 
not in Chinese. We then constructed parallel English- and Chinese-language descriptions of characters 
exemplifying these four personality types. Pretesting established that each character's personality was, in 
fact, more codable (i.e., more readily and accurately nameable) in one language than in the other. The 
following three groups of subjects were then presented with the descriptions and were later tested for their 
impressions of and memory for the characters: English monolinguals, Chinese-English bilinguals who 
read and responded in English, and Chinese-English bilinguals who read and responded in Chinese. We 
predicted that subjects working in English would show greater evidence of schematic thinking in the case 
of the two characters representing schemas labeled in English but not in Chinese, and that subjects 
working in Chinese would show greater evidence of schematic thinking in the case of the two characters 
representing schemas labeled in Chinese but not in English. 
We looked for the following specific indicators of schematic processing in our study (see Fiske & Taylor, 
1984). First, schematic processing typically involves “going beyond the information given” and, in the 
case of person cognition, leads the perceiver to infer schema-congruent attributes that were never directly 
observed. A second, related consequence of schematic processing is that it often leads the perceiver to 
misremember schema-congruent but never-seen attributes or behaviors as in fact having been displayed 
by the person and, more broadly speaking, often impairs the perceiver's later ability to distinguish 
presented and nonpresented information (e.g., in tests of recognition memory). Third, schematic 
processing has occasionally been demonstrated to facilitate free recall of information about the person (or 
at least the ability to reconstruct such information), particularly when the person is a highly prototypical 
example of the schema (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1979b; Forgas, 1983). 
A note regarding our choice of subject groups is in order at this point. Most studies in the linguistic 
relativity tradition have compared monolingual, or nearly monolingual, speakers of different languages. A 
problem with this type of study is that one cannot separate any effects of language per se from effects due 
to nonlinguistic cultural differences between the groups. The vast majority of English and Chinese 
monolinguals, for example, differ in many ways in addition to the language they speak. Our solution to 
this problem was to assign Chinese-English bilinguals randomly to think and respond in one or the other 
language during the experiment. A group of English monolinguals from the same university population 
was also studied. (Unfortunately, a sample of Chinese monolinguals was not available to us, let alone a 
sample demographically similar to the other groups. The inclusion of such a group was not, however, 
essential to the logic of the design.) The advantages of this design are that it allows true experimental 
control over the linguistic variable (at least in the case of the bilinguals) and enables one to isolate 
linguistic effects from more general cultural effects. In other words, to the extent that any obtained results 
are due to language per se, the English monolinguals and the Chinese-English bilinguals working in 
English should respond similarly and should differ from the Chinese-English bilinguals working in 
Chinese. A hidden assumption underlying this type of design is that bilinguals possess two relatively 
separate language codes, and that when utilizing one code, there is no strong, automatic tendency to 
access the other code and its associated schematic knowledge. If, on the other hand, bilinguals do tend to 
access both codes more or less simultaneously, then of course no effects of language would be obtained 
with a design such as this. 
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Pretest Studies: Development of the Stimulus Character Descriptions 
 
Method 
The behavioral descriptions used as stimuli in the main experiment were developed through a series of 
pretest studies. In the first of these, 18 English monolinguals were presented with 16 English-language 
personality trait terms and were asked to list as many attributes as they could think of, such as typical 
behaviors, attitudes, abilities, likes and dislikes, and so forth, that are associated with each of these 
personality types (cf. Cantor & Mischel, 1979a). Similarly, 18 Chinese-English bilinguals listed (in 
Chinese) attributes associated with the personality types named by 16 Chinese-language trait terms. On 
the basis of these data and our own intuitions concerning the connotative meanings of the terms, several 
personality types were selected for further study: two types named by English terms and two named by 
Chinese terms that appeared to have no corresponding label in the other language; two types that, 
although labeled in both English and Chinese, seemed to be missing an attribute in one language relative 
to the other; and two types that are labeled in both English and Chinese and appeared to have essentially 
identical attributional definitions in each language. After identifying clusters of related attributes 
associated with each of these eight personality types, we selected the three largest or most important 
clusters for each type and wrote 6 statements (each describing a specific behavior, attitude, ability, or 
other concrete attribute) for each cluster. In this way, character descriptions exemplifying the eight 
personality types were created, each of which consisted of 18 statements. All of the characters were 
young men identified only by an English first name. 
The original drafts of these descriptions were written primarily in English, and great care was taken to use 
the most concrete language possible and to avoid the use of trait terms or other expressions that do not 
have more or less exact equivalents in Chinese. Next, each description was translated into Chinese. 
Changes to the English originals were made whenever necessary to achieve equivalence of meaning. As a 
final step, the Chinese translations were back-translated into English by bilinguals unconnected with our 
research, and these back-translated descriptions were compared with the original English versions (cf. 
Brislin, 1970). This step resulted in a number of further changes to the materials. 
The remaining pretest studies were designed to test the correctness of our intuitions concerning the 
relative codability of the characters' personalities in English and Chinese. In the first of these codability 
studies, 10 English monolinguals and 8 Chinese-English bilinguals were presented with the English and 
Chinese versions of the descriptions, respectively. They were then asked to label each character with the 
best overall personality trait or type term they could think of, and also to rate how “accurately and 
completely” their term captured the character's personality. They then gave their second choice of 
descriptive term for each character, also rating how well it described him. 
For the second codability study, we first compiled a list of all English terms and a list of all Chinese terms 
(both first and second choices) used to describe any of the eight characters by subjects in the first study. 
To each of these lists we added the nearest equivalent, where one existed, of each term on the other list 
not already appearing in a fairly close translation, as well as a number of additional terms culled from 
subjects' responses in the attribute-listing study. This brought the total number of terms in each list to 103. 
A new group of English monolinguals (N = 20) and one of Chinese-English bilinguals (N = 19) were then 
presented with either the English or Chinese versions of the character descriptions and the trait list and 
were asked to (a) pick the one trait from the list that best described each character, (b) rate how accurately 
and completely that trait described him, and (c) select the second- and third-best trait descriptor for each 
character (ratings were not obtained for these traits). 
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Results 
On the basis of the results of the two codability studies (to be described shortly), four of the eight 
characters—those developed to exemplify the two English and the two Chinese trait terms having no 
close equivalent in the other language—were eventually used in the main experiment to test the research 
hypotheses. The two personality types with economical labels in English but not in Chinese were the 
artistic type and the liberal type. The artistic character (David) was described with statements relating to 
the following categories of attributes (derived from the attribute-listing study described earlier): (a) 
artistic skills and interests, (b) the artist's cognitive style and temperament (intense, moody, imaginative, 
fantasy prone, etc.), and (c) the bohemian lifestyle (unconventional behavior, attitudes, possessions). The 
description of the liberal character (Richard) exemplified these attribute categories: (a) liberal (i.e., 
progressive, left-wing) social and political attitudes, (b) tolerance and open-mindedness, and (c) a 
humanitarian, people-oriented outlook. Although Chinese has separate terms for the three attribute 
categories comprising each of these two types, in neither case is there an economical expression that 
incorporates, in the way that the English terms artistic type and liberal type do, all three attribute 
categories (as well as others not directly represented in the character descriptions). 
The two personality types with labels in Chinese but not in English were shì gù and shēn cáng bú lòu. The 
description of the shì gù character (Steven) exemplified these attribute categories: (a) greater than average 
experience of the world (well traveled, varied job experience, etc.), (b) a strong family orientation (in 
particular, devotion to the immediate family), and (c) well-developed social and interpersonal skills 
(especially the ability to smooth out difficult interpersonal situations). The shēn cáng bú lòu character 
(Kevin) was described with statements relating to the following attribute categories: (a) very 
knowledgeable and skilled in a wide variety of areas, both practical and intellectual, (b) reluctant to 
display this knowledge and skill unless it is absolutely necessary to do so, and (c) inconspicuous to the 
point of frequently being ignored or forgotten by others. Again, although English possesses labels for the 
individual attributes associated with these two personality types, it lacks economical terms capable of 
unifying these attributes into single, coherent concepts. The Chinese terms shì gù and shēn cáng bú lòu, 
on the other hand, imply exactly these two constellations of attributes (in addition to other attributes not 
explicitly represented in the character descriptions). 
The data shown in Table 1 confirmed our intuitions regarding the differential codabilities of these four 
stimulus personalities in English versus Chinese. As can be seen, English-language subjects in both 
codability studies believed that their freely chosen descriptors for the two characters based on English-
labeled schemas (artistic David and liberal Richard) were more accurate and complete than were their 
descriptors for the two characters based on Chinese-labeled schemas (shì gù Steven and shēn cáng bú lòu 
Kevin). Chinese-language subjects in both studies showed just the opposite pattern of ratings. Because the 
results of the two studies did not differ significantly (all F ratios for interaction effects involving study as 
a variable were less than 1), they were analyzed together to increase power (see the bottom panel of Table 
1 for the combined means). This analysis revealed that the predicted Language of Processing × Language 
of Schema interaction was reliable, F(1, 53) = 6.73, p < .02, and that no other effects reached 
significance. In sum, then, these studies established that the four characters created to exemplify schemas 
having labels in one of the languages but not in the other are indeed more readily and accurately codable 
by speakers of that language. 
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The data of the second codability study were also examined for evidence of the predicted trait labelings, 
and the results generally confirmed that the characters were labeled in the intended manner. The label 
most frequently chosen for Steven by the Chinese-language subjects was, as predicted, shì gù, which was 
listed by the majority of subjects. The English-language subjects' most frequent choice of label for Steven 
was considerate, which, as the reader who will refer to the description of that character can verify, does 
not adequately capture the important elements of his personality. Also as predicted, the label most 
frequently chosen for Kevin by the Chinese-language subjects was shēn cáng bú lòu. listed by a large 
majority of subjects. The English-language subjects most often chose reserved, which omits the 
skill/knowledgeability component of this character's personality, among other things. 
The label most frequently selected for David by the English-language subjects was, as predicted, artistic, 
listed by a clear majority of subjects. Chinese-language subjects most often chose yì shù tīān fèn, which 
means artistically talented, particularly in the visual or musical arts. This term, however, refers narrowly 
to artistic skill and carries no stereotypic connotations regarding the person's temperament or lifestyle, 
unlike the English term artistic type. In the case of Richard, the English-language subjects apparently 
regarded open-minded as a somewhat better descriptor than liberal (we had the latter label in mind when 
constructing this character), but liberal was the second most frequently listed term. Chinese-language 
subjects most often listed si xiˇang xin cháo, which roughly translates as trendy and is not a particularly 
apt description of Richard's personality. 
In general, we found the trait-labeling data quite encouraging in view of the fact that subjects had 103 
trait terms from which to select in describing the characters. After taking into account these and other data 
from the pretest studies, we reduced each character description from 18 to 15 statements in length 
(deleting what in our judgment was the weakest statement in each cluster). We also made a few final 
adjustments to some of the English and Chinese wordings, and the descriptions were considered ready for 
use in the main experiment. 
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Main Experiment 
 
Method 
Twelve English monolinguals and 24 Chinese-English bilinguals, all undergraduates at the University of 
Alberta, Canada, participated in the experiment. The following three groups comprised the between-
subjects variable in this study: (a) English monolinguals performing the experiment in English 
(hereinafter referred to as the E-E group), (b) Chinese-English bilinguals performing the experiment in 
English (the CE-E group), and (c) Chinese-English bilinguals performing the experiment in Chinese (the 
CE-C group). Bilingual subjects had previously been asked to rate, on a scale of 1 to 9, their fluency in 
both English and Chinese. Only those giving themselves a rating of 5 or greater for both languages were 
eligible to participate. The bilinguals were randomly assigned to the CE-E and CE-C conditions. There 
were 7 women and 5 men in each of the three groups. Each subject participated in two sessions conducted 
5 days apart. The same bilingual experimenter conducted both sessions for subjects in all three groups. 
In the E-E and CE-E conditions, all instructions (written and oral), stimulus materials, and response forms 
were in English, and subjects in the CE-E condition were asked to make every effort to think (and 
respond) exclusively in English during the experiment. Chinese instructions, stimulus materials, and 
response forms were used in the CE-C condition, and subjects were asked to think and respond 
exclusively in Chinese. 
In the first session, subjects were given a booklet containing the character descriptions, with instructions 
to read them as many times as necessary to form a distinct impression of each character's personality and 
to remember each character's name. Subjects were told that they would be required to answer questions 
about each character's personality when they returned 5 days later, but they were led to believe that they 
would not be expected to remember the descriptions in literal detail. The order of character descriptions 
was counterbalanced across subjects. 
In the second session, subjects performed the following four tasks in the order listed: 
Free impressions 
The subjects were given a list of the characters' names and were asked simply to write down their 
impressions of each character's personality. They were allowed 3 min per character in which to complete 
this task. 
The English- and Chinese-language free-impression data were each coded by two independent judges. 
One bilingual judge coded both the English- and Chinese-language responses. A second bilingual judge 
coded only the Chinese-language responses, and an English monolingual judge coded only the English-
language responses. The first step in coding the data was to segment the responses into information units, 
the smallest units of independent, meaningful information. For example, a sentence that described a 
character as “shy but intelligent” would be segmented into two information units: shy and intelligent. 
Whenever there was a subsidiary phrase that was meaningless without the main phrase, the two were 
counted together as one unit. Segmentation agreement was 85% for the English-language data and 92% 
for the Chinese-language data. Disagreements were decided by another judge. 
The segmented impression units were then classified into three categories: (a) description-based items—
those referring to attributes implicit in the original character description; (b) schema-congruent items—
those referring to attributes contained in the personality schema on which the character was based but not 
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directly represented in the character description (the attribute-listing data collected in the first pretest 
study served to define the contents of the personality schemas); for example, the attribute unreliable was 
not implicit in the description of David but is part of the artistic type schema and would therefore be 
scored as a schema-congruent item; and (c) miscellaneous items—this was a residual category for items 
referring to attributes not represented in the character description and not contained in the schema on 
which the character was based. 
Classification agreement was 92% for the English-language data and 78% for the Chinese-language data. 
Disagreements were again decided by another judge. Preliminary inspection of these data indicated that, 
although our hypotheses had been strongly confirmed, the Chinese-language responses had apparently 
been scored according to a looser criterion than had the English-language responses. In particular, there 
was a higher overall proportion of schema-congruent classifications and a lower overall proportion of 
miscellaneous classifications in the Chinese-language data than in the English-language data. Therefore, 
the Chinese data were given to a new bilingual judge and the English data to a new monolingual judge. 
The Chinese-language judge was instructed to review the original classifications and to apply a stricter 
criterion for the schema-congruent category, that is, to reclassify borderline cases of schema-congruent 
items as miscellaneous items. The English-language judge was instructed to apply a looser criterion for 
the schema-congruent category, that is, to reclassify borderline cases of miscellaneous items as schema-
congruent items. These revisions resulted in roughly comparable overall proportions of description-based, 
schema-congruent, and miscellaneous items in the Chinese- and English-language data. 
Free recall 
Subjects were told to write down as many statements from the original descriptions as they could 
remember. They were given 4 min per character in which to complete this task. 
The English- and Chinese-language recall data were each rated by two independent judges. The judges 
first decided if a given item could be matched with one of the stimulus sentences; if so, it was given a 
score of either 1 (the judge was barely able to match the recalled item with the original item), 2 (a fairly 
good reproduction, but one containing significant omissions, additions, or distortions), or 3 (an excellent 
reproduction except for minor details such as names, locations, etc.). Interjudge agreement was 82% for 
the English-language responses and 90% for the Chinese-language responses. Disagreements were 
decided by another judge. 
Recognition memory 
Of these 12 statements, 6 were taken from the original description (2 from each of the three attribute 
clusters) and 6 were new statements. Three of the new statements (schema-congruent foils) depicted 
behaviors consistent with the personality type on which the character was based. The other 3 new 
statements (schema-irrelevant foils) depicted behaviors unrelated to either the original character 
description or to the schema. 
Subjects were presented with 12 statements about each character and were asked to assign each statement 
a rating of either 1 (“I am certain this statement was not in the description”), 2 (“I think this statement was 
not in the description, but I'm not sure”), 3 (“I think this statement was in the description, but I'm not 
sure”), or 4 (“I am certain this statement was in the description”). Subjects had a total of 12 min in which 
to complete this task. 
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Inference 
Subjects were shown six entirely new statements pertaining to each character and were asked to rate the 
likelihood that each statement would be true of the character. Ratings were made on a 13-point scale 
ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 13 (very likely). Three of the statements (description-based items) were 
based directly on the original character description; that is, they described attributes implicit in the 
stimulus materials. An example of a description-based item pertaining to the artistic character is, “David 
is more easily moved by music, art, and literature than is the average person.” The other three statements 
(schema-congruent items) described attributes that were not implicit in the character description but were 
congruent with the schema on which the character was based. An example is, “David drinks heavily at 
times and likes to try out hallucinogenic drugs.” Subjects were allowed a total of 12 min in which to 
complete this task. 
Hypotheses 
We advanced the following hypotheses, all of which take the form of a Language of Processing × 
Language of Schema interaction: 
1. Subjects who had processed the stimulus information in English (E-E and CE-E groups) would have 
greater difficulty distinguishing presented and nonpresented items on the recognition-memory test for the 
characters based on English-labeled schemas, whereas subjects who had processed the stimulus 
information in Chinese (CE-C group) would have greater difficulty for the characters based on Chinese-
labeled schemas. This effect was predicted to be particularly evident in the recognition judgments made 
of the schema-congruent foils. 
2. Subjects who had processed the stimulus information in English would recall more of the material 
presented about the characters based on English-labeled schemas, whereas subjects who had processed 
the stimulus information in Chinese would do so for the characters based on Chinese-labeled schemas. 
3. Subjects who had processed the stimulus information in English would generate more schema-
congruent items in the free-impression task, and assign higher likelihood ratings to the schema-congruent 
items on the inference test, for the characters based on English-labeled schemas, whereas subjects who 
had processed the stimulus information in Chinese would do so for the characters based on Chinese-
labeled schemas. 
Results 
Hypothesis 1, which pertains to the recognition-memory test, was partially supported. Table 2 presents 
subjects' mean scores on the measure d′, which is an index of overall sensitivity to old versus new items. 
There was, first of all, a nearly significant but theoretically uninteresting main effect of language of 
schema, F(1, 33) = 2.96, p < .10, indicating that subjects tended to be less accurate for the characters 
based on Chinese-labeled schemas (mean d′ = 2.20) than for the characters based on English-labeled 
schemas (mean d′ = 2.49). In addition to this main effect of character type, however, a contrast testing the 
predicted Language of Processing × Language of Schema interaction was also significant, t(33) = 2.47, p 
< .01. The CE-C group was much less accurate for the characters based on Chinese-labeled schemas, the 
CE-E group was only slightly less accurate for those characters, and the E-E group was slightly less 
accurate for the characters based on English-labeled schemas. A further contrast comparing the two 
English-language conditions did not approach significance (t < 1).  
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Surprisingly, however, these differences in accuracy were due more to differences in the ability to 
recognize old items of information than to differences in the tendency to give false alarms to schema-
congruent foils. Table 3 presents subjects' mean recognition ratings of previously presented items. The 
Language of Processing × Language of Schema interaction was significant, t(3) = 2.37, p < .05. As the 
table shows, both groups of subjects working in English less confidently recognized information 
previously presented about the characters based on English-labeled schemas, whereas subjects working in 
Chinese less confidently recognized information previously presented about the characters based on 
Chinese-labeled schemas. 
 
 
 
As it turned out, between-condition variability in the tendency to give false alarms to schema-congruent 
foils was very highly correlated with between-condition variability in the tendency to give false alarms to 
schema-irrelevant foils (the correlation between the mean recognition ratings given to the two types of 
foils across the six cells of the design was r = .87). Because of this, it would not be appropriate to test the 
second part of Hypothesis 1 (which pertains to schema-congruent false alarms) directly on the schema-
congruent false-alarm scores per se. Therefore a derived measure was constructed, namely the subject's 
mean rating of the schema-congruent foils minus his or her mean rating of the schema-irrelevant foils. 
This measure provided an index of the subject's tendency to falsely recognize schema-congruent material 
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while simultaneously controlling for any tendency to give false alarms to all new items. The data for this 
relative false-alarm index are shown in Table 4. The hypothesized Language of Processing × Language of 
Schema interaction failed to reach significance, t(33) = 1.43, .05 < p < .10, although the pattern of means 
is more or less consistent with predictions (the E-E group showed a greater tendency to give false alarms 
for the characters based on English schemas, the CE-E group showed an equal tendency to give false 
alarms for both sets of characters, and the CE-C group showed a greater tendency to give false alarms for 
the characters based on Chinese-labeled schemas). The contrast comparing the two English-language 
conditions did not approach significance (t < 1). 
 
 
 
In retrospect, we believe that the weakness of the false-alarm results stemmed from the nature of the 
schema-congruent foils themselves. In general, these foils tended to describe behaviors that were roughly 
similar to behaviors appearing in the original character descriptions. This in turn may have acted to 
minimize any effect of schematic processing on subjects' tendency to give false alarms to these foils. Had 
we used schema-congruent foils that were more clearly distinct from the originally presented information, 
we suspect that the Language of Processing × Language of Schema interaction would have been stronger. 
Hypothesis 2 (that there would be a Language of Processing × Language of Schema interaction on the 
amount of freely recalled information about the characters) was not at all supported. In fact, the free-recall 
data showed no significant effects whatsoever on the number of items recalled, the accuracy with which 
items were recalled, or any other measure that we derived from these data. On the basis of this result, 
along with the finding that subjects less confidently recognized old information pertaining to characters 
based on labeled schemas in their language of processing, we may definitely conclude that schematic 
processing had no facilitative effect on memory for previously presented information in this study. 
Table 5 and Table 6 present the mean numbers of schema-congruent items in subjects' free impressions 
and mean ratings of the schema-congruent items on the inference test, respectively. Hypothesis 3 was 
strongly supported by both sets of results: Subjects' impressions contained more schema-congruent 
information, and subjects made stronger inferences regarding schema-congruent attributes, when the 
language in which they processed a stimulus character provided a label for the schema that the character 
exemplifies. The Language of Processing × Language of Schema interaction was significant both for the 
free-impression data, t(33) = 4.09, p < .001, and for the inference data, t(33) = 2.72, p < .01. The contrast 
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comparing the two English-language conditions did not reach significance in either analysis, t = 1.38 and 
t < 1, respectively. (The inference-test data also showed a main effect of language of schema in that 
subjects tended to make stronger inferences about the characters based on Chinese-labeled schemas than 
about the characters based on English-labeled schemas. Again, however, this is a theoretically 
insignificant result that merely shows that the schema-congruent items written for the Chinese-schema 
characters happened to be somewhat more strongly linked to their personalities than the items written for 
the English-schema characters were linked to theirs. The important finding is that the tendency to make 
stronger inferences about the Chinese-schema characters was much more pronounced in the case of 
Chinese-language subjects.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast to the results just described, there was no Language of Processing × Language of Schema 
interaction in the case of description-based attributes, either in the free-impression data (t < 1) or in the 
inference data (t < 1). 
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Discussion 
 
This study tested whether languages with differing repertories of labeled personality-type schemas are 
capable of exerting language-specific effects on their speakers' memory for and impressions of other 
people. It succeeded in demonstrating that both impressions and memory are affected when the target's 
personality and behavior conform to a labeled schema in the perceiver's language. These results should 
provide a broader, cross-linguistic perspective on current schema research in addition to extending the 
growing body of work on the language-cognition relation into the domain of social cognition (cf. 
Hoffman, Mischel, & Baer, 1984). 
An interesting pattern of results emerged from the free-impression and inference tasks. There were 
significant Language of Processing × Language of Schema interactions on the number and strength of 
schema-congruent inferences but not of description-based inferences. Thus, ready access to an appropriate 
labeled schema facilitated “going beyond the information given” but did not act to strengthen impressions 
or predictions concerning attributes implicit in the targets' actual behavior. 
The recognition-memory data provide further evidence of linguistic effects on thinking and also suggest a 
possible explanation for the pattern of results obtained with the free-impression and inference tasks. To 
restate the primary findings, subjects whose language of processing labels the schema on which a given 
character was based were less confident in recognizing previously presented items of information about 
the character and also tended (although nonsignificantly) to have greater difficulty in rejecting 
nonpresented but schema-congruent items of information. These findings suggest that the availability of a 
labeled schema may have led subjects to focus relatively less on the details of a target's behavior and 
instead rely more on their schematic knowledge of his personality type. Such a strategy has the advantage 
of greatly reducing the cognitive effort required of the perceiver, but also has the obvious disadvantage of 
causing confusion in memory between presented and nonpresented information. 
On the other hand, subjects without the benefit of a labeled schema apparently attended more closely to 
the target's behavior, as they exhibited superior recognition memory for previously presented information. 
This analysis can also explain the lack of a Language of Processing × Language of Schema interaction on 
description-based responses in the free-impression and inference tasks. Inferences about stimulus-based 
attributes could potentially have been reached in two ways—by consulting the appropriate schema or by 
consulting one's memory for the stimulus information—and the two srategies apparently yielded 
comparable results. In contrast, it is only by way of a schema that one can transcend the direct 
implications of the presented information, which accounts for the significant Language of Processing × 
Language of Schema interaction on schema-congruent responses in these tasks. 
It is of some interest to compare our findings with the results of the research on language and color 
memory, which represents the most extensive body of work to date on the language-and-thought question. 
Except for the substitution of personality types for colors, the logic of our study was very similar to that 
of the color-memory experiments—particularly the study by Stefflre et al. (1966), in which an actual 
cross-linguistic comparison was made. In both cases, the research strategy involved looking for possible 
effects of the linguistic codability of stimuli on memory for the stimuli (and, in our study, on inferences 
about the stimuli as well). The color-memory research, however, has consistently shown that the 
availability of an appropriate verbal description results in more accurate recognition memory for a given 
color, whereas our study found that ready access to an appropriate labeled schema resulted in less 
accurate recognition memory for a target person's behavior. 
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These divergent findings may have stemmed in part from differences in the recognition-memory tasks 
used. In our study, subjects were required to recognize facts about the stimulus person, whereas in the 
color-memory research the task was simply to identify the stimulus in an array. Had our study also 
required subjects to identify the target person in a group of similar individuals, it is possible that a 
facilitative effect of schema availability would have been found. Intuitively, however, this seems unlikely. 
We tend to think that the differences in results stem from differences in the nature of the stimuli 
themselves. Many of the important attributes of social stimuli—personalities in particular—are hidden 
from the perceiver's view, and consequently there is a need, or at least the opportunity, to rely heavily on 
the inference process in fleshing out one's representation of the stimulus. This, of course, can lead to 
confusion in memory between observed and inferred attributes—all the more so to the extent that one can 
apply a schematic label to the stimulus. In the case of colors, there is obviously little if any need or even 
possibility for the perceiver to infer additional attributes of the stimulus, if indeed it makes sense to speak 
of colors as having attributes at all. Consequently, if one's descriptive label for a color is a reasonably 
good one in the first place, there is no reason to expect it to bias one's later memory for the color. 
In many respects, color stimuli may be the exception rather than the rule. Certainly it seems to be true that 
most other nonsocial stimuli, including the natural objects studied by cognitive psychologists, more 
closely resemble most social stimuli than they do colors. There is, however, at least one fairly obvious 
difference in the effects of schematic processing on the representations that people form of social and 
nonsocial stimuli. This difference has to do not so much with the extent of people's inferences about the 
two types of stimuli but more with the accuracy of those inferences. In most cases where a natural object 
can be labeled with a relatively brief verbal expression at all, the label constitutes a highly useful 
description of the object, in the sense of being highly predictive of the object's attributes. Inferences about 
the important features of objects categorized as chairs, trees, or automobiles are very likely to be correct. 
In contrast, inferences about the attributes of persons categorized as artistic types or extraverts are nearly 
as likely to be wrong as to be right, if we accept the current wisdom regarding the generality and 
consistency of personality (or rather the lack thereof). People could pay a considerable price in accuracy 
by attempting to apply the same type of categorical thinking that serves them so well in the object domain 
to the world of social experience.  
We believe that our study provides somewhat more conclusive evidence for an effect of language on 
thought than have most previous studies using a cross-linguistic design. We say this because the design of 
this study allowed us to evaluate the role of nonlinguistic cultural differences between the groups as 
possible causes of the obtained effects, which is not the case with studies that simply contrast 
monolingual speakers of different languages or, more generally, with studies that limit their comparisons 
to two groups of subjects with differing cultural characteristics. Because the E-E and CE-E groups for the 
most part responded similarly but differed from the CE-C group, we have clear evidence for an effect of 
language per se. It is true, however, that although in no case did the difference between the E-E and CE-E 
groups reach significance, on some measures the CE-E group did tend to fall between the E-E and CE-C 
groups. This suggests that cultural differences also played a role in our results, albeit a smaller one than 
did the language-of-processing variable. 
On the other hand, there are at least two respects in which this study furnishes only limited evidence in 
support of the linguistic relativity hypothesis, beyond the obvious fact that the results are consistent only 
with the weak Whorfian view (i.e., that a given language makes certain ways of thinking either easier or 
more difficult) and not with the strong view (i.e., that a given language makes certain ways of thinking 
either obligatory or impossible). In the first place, we are unsure if the effects of language demonstrated 
here generally characterize most realworld cases of person cognition. Subjects in our study received 
relatively impoverished input about a relatively large number of stimulus persons and had to retain this 
information over a fairly long period of time. It is precisely under these difficult memory conditions that 
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we would expect the effects of verbally labeled schemas to be most pronounced. When people are able to 
focus their attention in a more leisurely manner on the behavior of individual persons, their impressions 
may not be structured to the same degree, if at all, in terms of labeled schemas such as artistic type. In the 
second place, this study has demonstrated only that a language's repertory of labeled categories (its 
lexicon) affects the categorizing behavior of its speakers. Far more controversial, and also far more 
interesting, are the possible effects of a language's grammar on the thought patterns of its speakers. Whorf 
himself believed that a language's grammar embodies the linguistic community's world view. With few 
exceptions, however (e.g., Bloom, 1981; Carroll & Casagrande, 1958), the effects of grammar on thought 
and behavior have gone unstudied, probably because it is so difficult to operationalize and measure the 
sorts of effects hypothesized by Whorf. The possibility that these fascinating ideas will someday yield to 
empirical scrutiny nonetheless remains an exciting one. 
Footnotes  
1 The two characters exemplifying trait terms with essentially identical meanings in the two languages 
were omitted from the main study to reduce subjects' memory load and because their inclusion was not 
essential to evaluate the hypotheses under study. The two characters exemplifying trait terms with a 
missing attribute in one language did not seem to be perceived in the intended manner by subjects in the 
pretest studies. Although modified versions of these two characters were included in the main study for 
exploratory purposes, they yielded no interpretable results and will therefore not be discussed further in 
this article. 
2 Chinese terms are given here in pīn yīn romanization kindly provided for us by J. S. Lin of the 
Department of East Asian Languages and Literatures, University of Alberta. Chinese-language materials 
in the actual studies were, of course, written in Chinese ideographs. 
3 The test for the Language of Processing × Language of Schema interaction, in this and all other 
analyses, was as follows. Because language of schema is a within-subjects variable, a difference score 
was first calculated for each subject by subtracting the mean score for the two characters based on 
Chinese-labeled schemas from the mean score for the two characters based on English-labeled schemas. 
The hypothesized interaction could then be tested by applying the following contrast to the difference 
scores just described: 1 (E-E), 1 (CE-E), −2 (CE-C). Because a directional pattern of means was 
predicted, one-tailed tests of significance were used. 
4 The E-E and CE-E groups were compared by applying the following contrast to the difference scores 
described in Footnote 3: 1 (E-E), −1 (CE-E). Because no differences between these two groups were 
anticipated, two-tailed tests of significance were used. 
5 Of relevance here is the distinction that Lingle, Altom, and Medin (1984) drew between membership 
attributes and inference attributes. Membership attributes are those that are (or can be) used to assign 
instances to categories in the first place, whereas inference attributes are those are simply implied by the 
fact of category membership. According to Lingle et al., membership attributes and inference attributes 
tend to be the same for natural object categories but not for social categories, particularly person 
categories. If this is true, it provides an obvious explanation for the difference in inferential accuracy that, 
as we have argued, is probably associated with the two types of categories. 
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